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model to show that a voter's expected payo¤ is proportional to its voting weight. They mention two di¢ culties in proving this result: corner solutions created by equal recognition probabilities, and nonhomogeneity of the game. Equal recognition probabilities may lead to low-weight voters having disproportionately high payo¤s due to proposing power, whereas nonhomogeneous games create a dif…culty in that players may be substitutes in some minimal winning coalitions but not in others, and it is not immediately obvious what the competitive price for their votes should be. They address these di¢ culties by making recognition probabilities proportional to voting weights and by replicating the game a …nite (though potentially large) number of times (see Proposition 2 in Snyder et al. (2005) ).
Since the proof in Snyder et al. (2005) only covers replicated games, how far this result extends to the legislatures with only a few parties that arise in applications is 2 an open question. The present paper provides a necessary and su¢ cient condition for proportional equilibrium payo¤s. This necessary and su¢ cient condition is relevant for any weighted voting game; the only assumption needed is that recognition probabilities are proportional to the voting weights. We give an interpretation of this condition in economic terms: there is no excess supply or demand of any player
type. An implication of this condition is that, even in the intuitively most favorable case (i.e. uniquely de…ned homogeneous weights and recognition probabilities proportional to those weights) the equilibrium of the game is not necessarily competitive. It may be possible for larger players to get a disproportionate payo¤ even if cheaper perfect substitutes appear to be available.
In order to get a rough idea of how often proportional payo¤s are predicted in applications, the condition is used to calculate the frequency with which the model actually predicts proportional payo¤s in Snyder et al.'s dataset of coalition governments in 14 countries from 1946 to 2001. Proportional payo¤s are predicted for about 69% of the legislatures; this proportion varies between countries and can be as high as 100% (for Australia and Austria) or as low as 28% (for Italy). Deviations from proportionality may be substantial, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and this is illustrated with some examples from the dataset. Perhaps the most important qualitative deviation is that it is possible for asymmetric parties to have the same equilibrium expected payo¤, even though one of the parties is a more desirable coalition partner and has a greater probability of being proposer. Also, minimal winning coalitions are not necessarily proposed in equilibrium (surplus coalitions in which the proposer is the only nonpivotal player are also possible).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and some simple examples, section 3 contains the characterization result, section 4 turns to the predictions of the model for the dataset, and section 5 concludes. 3 
Preliminaries
2.1 Weighted voting games N = f1; :::; ng is the set of players, S N represents a generic coalition and X is the set of alternatives. In the legislative bargaining model under consideration, there is a budget of size 1 to be divided and X = fxjx i 0 for all i and P i2N x i 1g is the set of all possible allocations. Player i's preferences are described by the utility
The voting game is described by a set of winning coalitions W , where a winning coalition is a coalition that can enforce any alternative in X. A voting game is
proper if a coalition S and its complement N nS cannot both be winning. A voting game is strong if ties are not possible, i.e., S and N nS cannot both be losing. We assume henceforth that the voting game is proper, but not necessarily strong. A minimal winning coalition (MWC) S is a coalition that is just large enough to win, that is, S is winning but no T S is winning.
The voting game is weighted if it is possible to assign a number of votes (weight) 
The noncooperative model
The noncooperative model is the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model with weighted voting.
Given a set of players N and an associated set of winning coalitions W , bargaining proceeds as follows. Nature randomly selects one of the players to be the proposer, according to a vector := ( 1 ; :::; n ) of recognition probabilities, where i 0 for all i 2 N and P n i=1 i = 1. The proposer then proposes a distribution (x 1 ; :::; x n ) of a budget, with x j 0 for all j = 1; :::; n and P n j=1 x j 1. This proposal is then voted upon. 2 If the set of voters in favor of the proposal is a winning coalition, the proposal is implemented and the game ends; otherwise the game proceeds to the next round in which the process is repeated. Players share a discount factor
A (pure) strategy for player i is a sequence i = ( t i ) 1 t=1 , where t i ; the t-th round strategy of player i, prescribes:
A proposal, denoted by x:
1 A large body of empirical literature is devoted to testing Gamson's law, which states that ministerial portfolios are allocated proportionally to the "raw" seat shares of parties in government irrespective of the voting weights (see Warwick and Druckman (2006) ). Cutler et al. (2014) incorporate both seat shares and MIWs in their statistical model, and …nd that MIWs have a bearing on which parties get into government, whereas portfolio allocation follows Gamson's law. 2 Voters are assumed to vote on the proposal sequentially. This assumption can be replaced by simultaneous voting plus the additional equilibrium re…nement that voters always vote as if their vote makes a di¤erence (see Baron and Kalai (1993) Players may condition their actions on the history of play; however the literature focuses on equilibria in which they do not condition on any elements of history other than the current proposal, if any. These equilibria are called stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE). Stationarity requires that players follow the same strategy at every round t regardless of past o¤ers and responses to past o¤ers. An SSPE always exists (Banks and Duggan, 2000) . For a …xed < 1, all SSPE involve immediate agreement (Okada, 1996) and lead to the same expected payo¤s (Eraslan and McLennan, 2013) . Expected equilibrium payo¤s are usually unique even if = 1; when they are not, it is possible to obtain a unique prediction by taking the limit when ! 1. As in Snyder et al. (2005), we consider the model with no discounting, i.e., = 1. Calculations for particular numerical examples assume
The logic of the Baron-Ferejohn model is simple. Take any stationary strategy combination. Because of stationarity, player i's expected payo¤ computed after a proposal has (just) been rejected takes a constant value; we denote this expected payo¤ (continuation value) by v i . Since = 1, this is also i's expected payo¤ computed at the start of the game. These expected payo¤s act as prices. It is optimal for player i to accept any proposal that guarantees him at least v i as a responder and to reject all other proposals. 3 Given that responders follow these cuto¤ strategies, it is optimal for player i as a proposer to …nd the cheapest group of players whose votes are enough to form a winning coalition and to o¤er each of them exactly v j . We say that player i proposes coalition S if i 2 S and the proposed payo¤ vector x has x j = v j for j 2 Snfig, x i = 1 P j2Snfig v j and x j = 0 for j 2 N nS. Let p i (S) be the probability that i proposes S. Any SSPE 3 There is little loss of generality in assuming that ties are always solved in favor of acceptance (see Yan (2002) , proposition 2; Eraslan and McLennan (2013), Appendix A).
6 involves a vector of players'acceptance thresholds (v i ) i2N and a vector of proposal probabilities (p i (S)) S3i;i2N satisfying two conditions (see Okada (1996) , theorem 2):
(1) Proposers propose only the cheapest coalitions available given responders'acceptance thresholds, that is, any coalition with p i (S) > 0 must minimize P j2T nfig v j (or, equivalently, P j2T v j ) subject to the constraint that T is a winning coalition with T 3 i. 
Intuitively, this bargaining model is competitive because a player with a disproportionately high v i would be overpriced and get few proposals if any, which would make it di¢ cult for the player to have a high v i in the …rst place.
Replicated games
Given the original weighted majority game [q; w 1 ; :::; w n ], the game with r replications has rn players and a quota qn. The weight vector is found by replacing each player i with r copies with weight w i . is a game in which player 1 belongs to all winning coalitions and therefore has veto power, whereas the corresponding game with r = 2, [6; 2; 2; 1; 1; 1; 1], has no veto players. Since the properties of replicated games are not always a good guide to the properties of the original game, it is worth examining the original game directly. 
Some simple examples of nonproportionality
In this section we discuss why equilibrium payo¤s may deviate from proportionality, using some simple examples.
The simplest examples of deviation from proportionality are games with a veto player, such as [3; 2; 1; 1]. The veto player gets everything (Winter, 1996) even though it has only half of the total weight. It is clear that the substitution argument does not bite in this case, since the veto player must be in all coalitions and cannot be replaced by other players.
Games with veto players are special since the veto player cannot be replaced at all, hence we would not expect proportionality to hold. 4 However, lack of substitutability is not con…ned to games with veto players, as the following example illustrates.
Consider the weighted voting game [5; 3; 2; 2; 1], discussed in Montero (2000) .
This is a homogeneous game, and the weights reported are MIWs. There are two types of MWCs: the large party together with one of the medium-size parties, and the three smaller parties together. Let v [3] , v [2] and v [1] denote the expected equilibrium payo¤s for a player with 3, 2 and 1 votes respectively. Since each medium-size party could form a coalition with either the large party or the two smaller parties, one would expect v [3] = v [2] + v [1] . However, there is no particular reason to expect v [2] = 2v [1] . A player with 2 votes need not command a price equal to that of two players with 1 vote each, since no two players with 1 vote are available to replace the player with 2 votes. 5
Example 1 Consider the weighted voting game [5; 3; 2; 2; 1]. Let = Proof. See Appendix. 4 Indeed, Snyder et al. (2005) exclude games with veto players from their analysis. 5 Situations where one player cannot be replaced by smaller players in a MWC are known as games with steps (see Ostmann (1987) ).
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Note that equilibrium payo¤s are quite di¤erent from the MIWs we started from.
In particular, the ratios v [3] =v [1] and v [2] =v [1] are 5 and 4 respectively instead of 3 and 2. Intuitively, there is an excess demand for the medium-size players. There is competition for the medium-size players, since they are needed by both the large and the small player, and there is no competition at all for the small player. As a result, the medium-size players receive too many proposals and the other two players do not receive enough proposals to sustain payo¤s proportional to .
The ambiguity of the perfect substitutes argument (or, equivalently, the lack of uniqueness of the homogeneous representation) is not the only reason why equilibrium payo¤s may di¤er from the MIWs. The following example illustrates the lack of proportionality of equilibrium payo¤s in a particularly surprising setting, where this issue does not arise. The substitutability argument points in a very clear direction: a large player can be replaced by …ve small players, and should get …ve times as much. Suppose players are recognized with probabilities proportional to their voting weight, i.e., a large player is recognized with probability 5 34 and a small player is recognized with probability . Hence, the large players are getting a disproportionately high payo¤ since v [5] > 5v [1] .
Proof. In order to show that this is an equilibrium, we need to …nd strategies that lead to the expected payo¤s and are optimal given the expected payo¤s. The strategies are as follows: all players propose a coalition of three large players and …ve small players, and the proposer o¤ers the coalition partners either 50 331 (for large players) or 9 331 (for small players). As a responder, a large player votes in favor of any proposal that gives him at least 50 331 , and a small player votes in favor of 9 any proposal that gives him at least 9 331 . Proposers are acting optimally given the responders' prices: no other winning coalition would be cheaper. Responders are acting optimally provided that expected payo¤s are indeed those, so it only remains to check that expected payo¤s are as assumed given the strategies: Indeed, adding another small player would lead to proportional payo¤s. Interestingly, this is not the whole story: removing one of the small players would also lead to proportional payo¤s (more on this in the next section).
3 A necessary and su¢ cient condition for proportionality Montero (2006) shows that, if coincides with the nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969) ), v coincides with the nucleolus as well. A su¢ cient condition automatically follows from this result: if the weights happen to be proportional to the nucleolus, expected payo¤s are proportional to the weights. 6 Peleg (1968) shows that MIWs are pro- 6 This condition is not necessary. For example, the nucleolus of the game [10; 3; 3; 3; 2; 2; 2] is ), which is not a system of weights at all, and nevertheless expected payo¤s would be proportional to the weights. I'm grateful to Peter Sudhölter for pointing out this example, which appears in Kopelowitz (1967) .
portional to the nucleolus for all strong homogeneous games, hence the game being in this class is a su¢ cient condition for the proportionality of expected payo¤s.
The arguments in Montero (2006) can be adapted to provide a more general su¢ cient condition for expected payo¤s to be proportional to an arbitrary system of weights. Moreover, this condition turns out to be necessary as well as we show below.
Let W be the set of winning coalitions with minimum total weight, i.e. W = arg min S2W P i2S w i . This set is weakly balanced if it is possible to …nd a collection of weights ( S ) S2W such that S 0 for all S 2 W and
Proposition 3 Let [q; w 1 ; :::; w n ] be an arbitrary weighted majority game, normalized so that P i2N w i = 1, and let = w. There exists an SSPE with v = w if and only if W is weakly balanced.
Proof. Because we haven't imposed any conditions on the weights, it is possible that no coalition has exactly q votes. Let min S2W P i2S w i := q. 7 1. Necessity. Suppose we have an SSPE with v = w. Expected payo¤s are given
where v i is i's expected payo¤, i is the probability that i is selected to be proposer,
is the probability that i proposes S conditional on i being the proposer, and r i is the probability that i receives a proposal from another player.
Consider …rst the case in which w i > 0 for all i and each player belongs to at least one coalition in W . Then, if expected payo¤s coincide with w, the optimal coalitions for the proposer are the coalitions in W to which it belongs. Since these coalitions have a total weight of q, P j2Snfig v j = q w i for all the proposed 7 For example, if w = and q = 7 13 , there is no coalition with exactly 7 13 votes and q = 8 13 .
coalitions, and
Dividing by w i (which we have assumed to be positive), it must be the case that r i = q w i , i.e. r i + w i = q. Since w i is also the probability of being proposer, we see that the total probability of being part of the …nal coalition (the probability of being proposer, w i , plus the probability of being responder, r i ) must be the same for all players. This implies that, if p(S) is the equilibrium probability of coalition S forming, P S3i p(S) = q for all i. Notice also that only coalitions with q votes form in equilibrium (other coalitions are too expensive), so we may write P S:S2W ;S3i p(S) = q for all i. If we divide both sides of the equation by q and de…ne S := p(S)=q, we obtain P S:S2W ;S3i S = 1 for all i. In other words, the set of minimal winning coalitions with q votes must be weakly balanced.
If there is a player with w i > 0 who does not belong to any of the coalitions with exactly q votes, this player needs to buy more than q w i votes, and its payo¤ as a proposer is less than 1 (q w i ). We then write
If we replace v i and i by w i and divide everything by w i , collecting terms we …nd r i + w i > q: Since q > 1 2 we …nd that r i + w i > 1 2 , i.e., player i's probability of being in the …nal coalition is above 1 2 . Let S be one of the coalitions with q votes. Players in S will never include i in their proposal. But this then implies that player i is in the …nal coalition with a probability of at most 1 q, which is less than If v = w and w i = 0 for some i, we can still show that the set W must be weakly balanced. Note that players with w i = 0 trivially belong to at least one coalition in
Since by assumption P S3i S = 1 for all i, the strategy is well de…ned. As a responder, player i accepts proposals if and only if x i w i .
We now show that this strategy combination leads to v i = w i for all i. This is trivially the case if w i = 0, since by assumption this player has no chance of being proposer and no other player o¤ers i a positive payo¤ as a responder. If w i > 0, player i's expected payo¤ given this strategy combination equals
By assumption, i = w i . Player i's payo¤ as a proposer can be written as 1 (q w i ) since player i only proposes coalitions in W and by de…nition these coalitions have a total weight of q. The probability of receiving a proposal, P j2N nfig j P S fi;jg p j (S), can be rewritten as P S3i P j2Snfig j p j (S). Hence,
Since by construction only coalitions in W are proposed and those have p j (S) = S , we can write Furthermore, since j = w j and P j2Snfig w j = q w i for all S 2 W we have P j2Snfig j = q w i . We can then write The condition can be interpreted as a requirement for the set of cheapest coalitions to be su¢ ciently rich, so that no player is systematically in excess supply or demand. Fix a vector of prices. The cheapest set of coalitions given those prices are the coalitions most likely to form. If we can have a probability distribution over those coalitions such that all players are equally likely to be in the …nal coalition, this is a sign that the prices are competitive. Instead, if a player always or never appears in the …nal coalition, that player must be underpriced or overpriced.
There are no requirements on [q; w] in order for the condition to apply. Note however that the condition has almost no chance to hold if w is the vector of seat shares, since in general not all parties will belong to a coalition with the minimum number of seats. 8 MIWs on the other hand ensure that all players belong to a winning coalition of minimum total weight, though even in this case the condition does not necessarily hold as we have seen. 9 Example 1 is a clear case of violation of this condition: player 4 is an inferior player (Napel and Widgrén, 2001 ) in that it can only be in a MWC when players 2 and 3 are also present; since player 1 also needs either player 2 or player 3, it is impossible for all players to be in the …nal coalition with equal probability. Example 2 is a more subtle instance of the same problem. There are two types of MWC,
[5555] and [55511111]. Even in the most favorable case for the small players, which is when the only coalition type that forms is [55511111], it is still the case that a type [5] player ends up in the coalition with probability winning coalitions: f1; 2g; f1; 3g; f1; 4g; f2; 3; 4g. The coalition with the minimum total number of seats is f2; 3; 4g, with 319 seats. Party 1 does not belong to any coalition with 319 seats, hence the corresponding W would not be balanced. 9 Even though there are no requirements on [q; w] in order for the condition to apply, there is an important requirement on the game form: recognition probabilities must be proportional to w. Some of these observations correspond to trivial cases in which either one party has the overall majority or all parties are de facto symmetric. If we excluded trivial cases (de…ned as cases in which all minimal integer weights are 0 or 1), the overall frequency of the proportional equilibrium prediction would drop to about 59%.
Predicted size of the deviations
The necessary and su¢ cient condition in Proposition 3 provides a yes/no answer on proportionality: if it fails, expected equilibrium payo¤s cannot be proportional.
But how far are they from being proportional? The following tables compare equilibrium payo¤s and weights for all games in the dataset with at most 7 players that fail to satisfy the condition (excluding games with a veto player, of which there are two in the database). For each game, the table shows w i (the MIWs), v i (expected equilibrium payo¤s), and two quantitative measures of how far v is from being proportional to w. One such measure is
, the ratio of payo¤s to weights, where weights are normalized so that they add up to 1. This ratio measures how much of a player's weight is translated into expected equilibrium payo¤s; if expected equilibrium payo¤s were proportional to weights it would always be 1. Another measure is the relative payo¤s v i =v n , i.e. the exchange rate between players according to equilibrium predictions. If expected equilibrium payo¤s were proportional, this exchange rate would always be equal to w i =w n (in particular, if w n = 1, this ratio would replicate the MIWs).
Expected payo¤s for individual players can be substantially di¤erent from weight shares, and this is very often true for the smallest player type, who may get as little as 43% of its weight share. As a result, ratios between a player's payo¤ and the payo¤ of the smallest player are very di¤erent from w i =w n . For example, in the game [9; 5; 4; 4; 1; 1; 1], a player with 5 votes does not get 5 times as much as a player with 1 vote, but about 12 times as much. Nevertheless, if we focus on the ratio of expected payo¤s to weights, we see that many players get an expected payo¤ that is close to their voting weight. 
Qualitative equilibrium phenomena
An alternative way of looking at the importance of deviations is to focus not on their size, but on the presence of equilibrium phenomena that would be ruled out if Proof. See Appendix.
Asymmetric players may have the same payo¤
Example 4 shows that it is possible for two players to have the same equilibrium expected payo¤s, even though one of the players is more valuable as a coalition partner and has the additional advantage of a higher recognition probability. [7] > v [6] and v [4] > v [3] Given this list, player [1] would need the cooperation of player [6] and both players of type [3] , whereas player [4] would need player [6] and one of the players of type [3] . Likewise, player [7] would need either player [6] or both players of type [3] .
Types [6] and [3] would be more in demand than types [7] and [4] , and it would not be possible to have v [7] > v [6] and v [4] > v [3] . It turns out that, in equilibrium, v [7] = v [6] and v [4] = v [3] .
Some players may be too expensive to receive proposals
The equalities v [7] = v [6] and v [4] = v [3] [6] + v [4] + v [3] = v [6] + 2v [3] < v [6] + 2v [3] + v [1] .
Note that the substitutability logic applies to this example, but in a somewhat perverse way. Looking at the SSPE payo¤s, player [1] appears underpriced since it only expects about 0:02 even though its weight share is about 0:04. Types [6] and [3] are getting a disproportionately high payo¤ compared to their weight share but this does not result in their exclusion; instead, it is type [1] that is excluded. Indeed, given that v [7] = v [6] and v [4] = v [3] ; player type [1] would be perceived as too expensive for any positive value of v [1] .
Surplus coalitions may form
The original Baron-Ferejohn model with symmetric players always leads to minimal winning coalitions, since the proposer could otherwise drop one of the responders and still have a winning coalition. With asymmetric players, it is still true that all coalition partners must be pivotal, but the proposer is not necessarily pivotal. In the previous example, type [1] …nds it optimal to propose surplus coalitions such as given that v [7] = v [6] and v [4] = v [3] . Hence, surplus coalitions are not ruled out in equilibrium under weighted voting, though the only type of surplus coalition that may form is one in which the proposer is the only member of the coalition who is not pivotal.
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Concluding remarks
This paper provides a necessary and su¢ cient condition for equilibrium payo¤s to be proportional in the Baron-Ferejohn model with weighted voting. When the condition is satis…ed, the set of available coalitions is su¢ ciently rich so that none of the parties appears systematically too often (excess demand) or too seldom (excess supply) in the …nal coalition. The condition is relatively easy to check in applications since all equations involved are linear. Using the condition, it is found that the frequency of legislatures in the …eld with proportional equilibrium payo¤s is about 69%, though there is a lot of variation across countries. This frequency may be viewed as su¢ ciently high to support empirical work, specially in the countries where it is highest.
Most counterexamples are not a result of the competitive bargaining logic failing, but rather of its working in unexpected ways. However, in these cases the deviations from proportionality may be substantial, both quantitatively and qualitatively, as the examples provided illustrate. . What would be the optimal proposer behavior given v? The player with 3 votes needs to buy 2 votes, hence it always o¤ers v [2] to one of the players with 2 votes (the player with 1 vote is of no use to this player, regardless of the value of v [1] ). The player with 1 vote needs to buy 4 votes, and will buy them from the two players that control 2 votes each. A player with 2 votes needs to buy 3 votes, and would be indi¤erent between buying them from the large player or from the other two players since v [3] = v [2] + v [1] . Let p be the probability that a player with 2 votes proposes to the player with 3 votes (conditional on a player with 2 votes being selected as proposer). Expected payo¤s for types [3] 3 8 for type [3] , p must be 1 2 . Interestingly, the equilibrium is still competitive in the sense that v [3] = v [2] +v [1] .
Below we construct an equilibrium strategy pro…le. Let player [3] propose to each of the two players of type [2] with probability 1 2 , and let each of the players of type [2] propose to player [3] with probability p. The equilibrium values of v [3] , v [2] , v [1] 27 and p can be found from the following system:
The solution to this system is v be proposed in equilibrium. It can be checked that the necessary and su¢ cient condition for proportionality does not hold: for any probability distribution over those coalitions, type [6] and/or type [3] would appear in the …nal coalition disproportionately often.
It turns out that, even though there are …ve player types, SSPE payo¤s divide the players in only three groups, which we denote as L, M and S. We now construct an equilibrium with v [7] = v [6] := v L , v [4] = v [3] := v M , v [1] := v S and v L = 2v M . In this situation, player [7] is indi¤erent between proposing to the other large player and paying v L , and proposing to two medium players, paying v M to each (v L in total). Type [6] is also indi¤erent between buying votes from the large player or from two medium players (except that, when buying votes from a medium player, one of the two medium players has to be of type [4] 1 3 Note that we are simplifying the …rst …ve equations by using the sixth one (i.e., all coalitions proposed with positive probability in equilibrium must give the same payo¤ to the proposer). For example, player [6] 's proposer payo¤ is written as 1 vL rather than [1 vL] + (1 ) [1 2vM ].
